ABSTRACT Simeck, a family of lightweight block ciphers utilizing Simon-like structure, is widely used under resource constrained environment. So far, many cryptanalysis methods have been used to attack Simeck. In this paper, we give the new results of integral cryptanalysis on reduced-round Simeck. First, the exact algebraic degree of Simeck32 is given by parallel computing, and then the 13-round theoretical integral distinguisher is proposed to attack 20-round Simeck32(64). Besides, by using the equivalent-subkey and partial-sum technology, combined with the meet-in-the-middle strategy and subkey relationship, the 22-round Simeck32(64) integral attack is first proposed based on the 15-round integral distinguisher. Furthermore, based on 18-round and 21-round integral distinguishers, the new integral attacks on 26-round Simeck48(96) and 30-round Simeck64(128) are proposed, respectively. These new attacks greatly improve the results of the previous integral attacks for Simeck.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet of things and wireless sensor networks, RFID and other micro terminal devices have been widely applied. In order to meet the need of information security under such resource constrained environment, the National Security Agency published two families of lightweight block cipher SIMON [1] and SPECK [1] . Later, a new block cipher family Simeck [2] utilizing Simon-like structure is proposed. It adopts the advantages of SIMON and SPECK, and performs well in both software and hardware implementations.
The previous security analysis of Simeck mainly focused on traditional differential and linear analysis, impossible differential attack, zero sum attack and integral attack. Yang et al. [2] gave the results of differential analysis and impossible differential analysis. Later, Qiao et al. [3] gave the results of differential analysis of longer rounds with probabilistic algorithm. In 2015, Kölbl and Roy et al. [4] gave better results of differential analysis on Simeck48 and Simeck64. In the same year, the security of Simeck against linear attack and zero sum attack was evaluated, respectively in [5] and [6] . After that, linear hull attack on round-reduced Simeck was proposed in [7] . In 2016, integral distinguishers
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of Simeck were constructed for the first time in [8] , and integral attacks were proposed.
Integral attack is an effective cryptanalysis method. In 1997, Daemen et al. [9] proposed a new method to attack SQUARE. By summarizing previous works, Knudsen and Wagner [10] further put forward the idea of integral attack at FSE 2002. The integral attack selects a specific form of plaintexts to encrypt, and makes sum of the obtained corresponding ciphertexts, and then distinguishes the cipher from a random permutation. The key point of integral attack is to find integral distinguishers. In recent years, new search algorithms, like SAT-based method and MILP method, are applied to integral attacks to search integral distinguishers automatically, which greatly speed up the search efficiency of integral distinguishers and improve results [11] , [12] .
Our Contribution: This paper focuses on integral attack against Simeck. To generate round keys of Simeck2n(4n), the round function is reused. This character has not been used in previous integral attacks, but we discovery some properties of it and make use of these to attack Simeck. Besides, although some methods have been used before, we combine them to improve the analysis results on Simeck. Also, to obtain the better attack results, our key recovery attacks based on better distinguishes than before.
First, we compute the algebraic degree of arbitrary rounds for Simeck32 in a short time using the GPU acceleration and parallelization algorithm, and then we give the 13-round theoretical integral distinguisher for Simeck32. Based on the distinguisher given in [12] , combined with the meet-in-the-middle strategy and subkey relationship, we give the 22-round Simeck32 integral attack using the equivalent-subkey and partial-sum technology. This is the best result for the integral attack on Simeck32. Table 1 lists the main attack results of Simeck32. Although the attack results of 22-round and 23-round Simeck32 were given, the success rates were really low (both less than 0.5). However, our attack success rate is 1.
For Simeck48 and Simeck64, we propose 26-round and 30-round integral attack results respectively utilizing the integral distinguishers given in [12] . Table 2 lists the main attack results of Simeck48 and Simeck64. Our new attack greatly improve the previous integral attack results. This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some notations used in this paper and gives a brief description of Simeck family cipher. Section III describes some methods to optimize the complexity of integral attack used in the paper. Section IV gives algebraic degree of Boolean functions of Simeck32 and proposes the integral attack on the Simeck32(64). Section V briefly proposes integral attacks on Simeck48(96) and Simeck64(128). We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
Throughout the paper, we will use the following notations.
• Simeck2n(4n): n is the length of a bit-vector, and the block and key size of the Simeck are 2n and 4n, respectively.
• L i : an n-bit intermediate value (left half of the input of ith round in the encryption), the jth bit of L i is denoted as L i (j). 
FIGURE 1.
The round function for simeck.
• R i : an n-bit intermediate value (right half of the input of ith round in the encryption), the jth bit of R i is denoted as R i (j).
• K : master key. For Simeck2n(4n),
• rk i : an n-bit round key for the ith round.
• ⊕: XOR operation.
• <<< r: left rotation for r bits.
• >>> r: right rotation for r bits.
• ''&'','' '': bitwise AND operation.
• g: a mapping F n 2 → F 2 , where F 2 is a number field composed of two elements and F n 2 is an n-dimensional linear space over F 2 . g is also called a n-variable Boolean function.
• B n : the set of all the n-variable Boolean function.
• C = E(P, Pk): an iterative cipher. P, C and Pk reprensent plaintext, ciphertext and master key respectively.
B. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION ON SIMECK
The round function for Simeck is very similar to that for SIMON and the only difference is the rotation constants. The key schedule follows the idea of round function reused in SPECK. The parameters of each version for Simeck are illustrated in the Table 3 below.
1) ROUND FUNCTION FOR SIMECK
The structure of Simeck is a two-branch balanced Feistel network and the round function only consists of bitwise AND, XOR and rotation. The iteration process of the round function( Figure 1 ) can be expressed as follows
.
2) KEY SCHEDULES FOR SIMECK
The master key K for Simeck2n(4n) consists of four n-bit words ( 
where 0 ≤ i < T − 1. The value of the constant c is defined by c = 2 n − 4. (z j ) i denotes the ith bit of the sequence z j . Simeck32(64) and Simeck48(96) use the same m-sequence z 0 , while Simeck64(128) uses another m-sequence z 1 .
III. THE METHOD OF OPTIMIZING THE COMPLEXITY OF INTEGRAL ATTACK A. EQUIVALENT-SUBKEY TECHNOLOGY
Isobe and Shibutani [13] first put forward the equivalentsubkey technology at ASIACRYPT 2013, which is used to recovery the key of Feistel block ciphers. Later, the equivalent-subkey technology is widely used in various key recovery attacks to reduce the number of subkey bits by replacing the original subkeys with the equivalent subkeys.
Considering the characteristics of Feistel structure, the position of the key addition can be changed. In this case, new round keys are obtained by linear transformation of the original round keys. With equivalently moving of round keys inside the algorithm scheme, the values of intermediate rounds indeed are changed. Note that those transformed internal states are just the XOR value of original states and new round keys. Since integral distinguisher only distinguishes different XOR values of a multi-set, ⊕ x∈X x is equal to ⊕ x∈X (x + c) for any multi-set X and any constant c, if the number of the elements in X is even.
The key work of this technique is to find the equivalent-subkey of the original subkey by a simple transformation and reduce the number of guessed bits effectively. It is important to study the specific operations of Simeck round function.
B. MEET-IN-THE-MIDDLE STRATEGY
In 1977, Diffie and Hellman [14] put forward the meet-in-themiddle method when analyzing Two-DES. Nowadays, many researchers extend this method to more general cases and obtain some good attack results.
Its basic principle is as follows. For an iterative cipher C = E(P, Pk), the encryption function E is decomposed into two parts E 1 and E 2 and the subkeys used for these two parts are Pk 1 and Pk 2 . Consequently, the encryption process can be expressed as C = E 2 (E 1 (P, Pk 1 ), Pk 2 ). First, calculate and store C = E(P, Pk) for the known plaintext P and all the possible values of Pk 1 . Next, guess a value of Pk 2 , and partially decrypt the ciphertext C corresponding to the plaintext P to gain E −1 2 (C, Pk 2 ). Finally, check if there is a certain Pk 1 satisfying E 1 (P, Pk 1 ) = E −1 2 (C, Pk 2 ), which may be the correct key. Repeat the above steps to find the correct key. When the length of Pk 1 and Pk 2 are both less than the length of master key Pk, the time complexity of meet-in-themiddle attack is less than that of the exhaustive search.
In the process of integral attack on Simeck, it is necessary to find the appropriate position where E 1 and E 2 meet, making use of the equivalent-subkey technology at the same time. Then we can make the complexities of two parts keep low.
C. PARTIAL-SUM TECHNOLOGY
Partial-sum technology is first proposed by Ferguson et al. [15] at FSE 2000 to improve the attack results on Rijndael. By guessing the subkeys by byte, we can reduce the complexity of partial decryption to balanced state.
In the process of partial decryption, the complexity is high if we guess all the key bits at the same time. In fact, not all bits are interrelated with each other in a round. Therefore, the input, output and the corresponding round key of a round can be divided into relatively independent parts. Decrypting each part can reduce the guessed bits and the exhaustive intermediate states in each step, so the time complexity is reduced.
In order to optimize the time complexity, when decrypt Simeck partially, not only the number of segmented rounds and the divided states of each part should be clearly defined, but also the order of calculation each part needs to be determined properly.
IV. INTEGRAL CRYPTANALYSIS ON REDUCED-ROUND SIMECK32
In order to find the integral distinguishers for Simeck32 faster, we first calculate the algebraic degree to estimate the number of rounds of the integral distinguisher and prove that there is a 13-round theoretical integral distinguisher for Simeck32. Making use of the equivalent-subkey technology, the meetin-the-middle strategy and the partial-sum technology at the same time, the number of guessed bits is reduced and the time complexity is optimized considering the properties of key expansion.
A. CALCULATION OF ALGEBRAIC DEGREE OF SIMECK32
For block ciphers, the round functions can be expressed as Boolean functions for the input of the round. By studying the properties of the algebraic normal form of these iterative Boolean functions, we can find some new methods to improve the cryptanalysis results. Particularly, there is a direct relationship between the integral distinguisher and the algebraic degree of Boolean function. The number of rounds of the integral distinguisher can be estimated with the algebraic degree, which can help establish a longer integral distinguisher. Thus, we want to calculate the algebraic degree of Boolean function of any round of Simeck32. 
Pos = Pos + 2 · Sz 7: return the obtained table v
The most direct way to determine the algebraic degree of a Boolean function is to calculate the algebraic normal form. For a n-variable Boolean function g(x), it can be uniquely expressed in the following form:
where the addition operation is ⊕ and h is a Boolean function defined by a Mobius inversion transformation:
According to the above formulas, if g ∈ B n , then with the true table of Boolean functions, the Mobius inversion transformation can be used to calculate the algebraic normal form of Boolean functions by Algorithm 1. The time complexity and space complexity of this algorithm are O(n2 n ) and O(2 n ), respectively.
Although the truth table can be used to directly calculate the algebraic normal form of a Boolean function, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is high. Considering GPU can provide tens or even hundreds of times of CPU performance in the aspect of floating point computing and parallel computing because of its multi-core, multi-thread, high bandwidth and high parallelism, we first set up a CUDA parallel solution model and use GPU to accelerate the calculation of truth table. Moreover, we adopt the parallel optimization algorithm proposed by Joux [16] which can achieve 32 bits simultaneous operation to speed up the running time of Mobius transformation.
For Simeck32(64), we regard the master key as constant and one output bit can be expressed as the Boolean function for input. Coefficients of some terms are round-key bits, and some terms are irrelevant to round-key bits. We find terms relevant to round-key bits are always factors of terms irrelevant to round-key bits by giving algebraic normal form of Boolean functions of first three rounds. Further, We can easily prove that this conclusion is correct for Boolean function of any round with mathematical induction. Consequently, we don't need to consider master key when compute the algebraic degree. Then we can easily calculate the algebraic degree for arbitrary round Boolean function in 10 minutes. The results VOLUME 7, 2019 are illustrated in Table 4 . The algebraic degree after 12 rounds of encryption is 30, less than 31, so it is easy to prove that there is a 12-round integral distinguisher 
, then we can get the 13-round partition by adding 1 round ahead.
B. THE PROPERTIES OF SIMECK KEY EXPANSION
The key expansion for Simeck uses LFSR to generate round keys, and the round function is reused when the update of register state. However, the essence of the round key is to use the lower number of round keys to generate higher number of round keys, and the iterative operation is relatively simple. Therefore, by studying the subkey relationship of Simeck, we can reduce the number of guessed key bits. It is not difficult to find that first four round keys for Simeck2n(4n) are equal to K 3 , K 2 , K 1 , K 0 , respectively. Moreover, rk i+4 is only determined by rk i , rk i+1 and c i , which means it has nothing to do with other round keys. Based on the above findings, the following properties are given.
Theorem 1: For the algorithm is Simeck2n(4n), we have
Proof: From the formula(1) and formula(2) of key expansion algorithm for Simeck, we obtain that rk i+1 = t i = rk i−3 ⊕ f (t i−3 ) ⊕ c i−3 when i ≥ 3. Besides, we know that t i−3 = rk i−2 from formula (1). Therefore, rk i+1 can be expressed by rk i−3 , rk i−2 and c i−3 : bit in rk i needs to be calculated, it is only need to know some bits in rk i+4 and rk i .
Theorem 2: For the algorithm is Simeck2n(4n), we have rk i
It is worth noting that in the process of attack, making use of the relationship between the equivalent subkey and the original subkey, the value of the equivalent round key of lower number of round can be calculated by using this property.
C. ATTACK PROCESS OF INTEGRAL CRYPTANALYSIS ON 22-ROUND SIMECK32(64)

In [12], 14-round integral distinguisher (CAAA, A, A, A, A, A, A, A) → (U, U, U, U, BBUU , UBBU , UUBB, UUUB)
is found. On the basis of this distinguisher, we can get the 15-round distinguisher by adding 1 round ahead. Although there are 7 balanced bits for this distinguisher, we just take the least significant balanced bit into consideration, in order to make the rounds appended after the integral distinguisher as long as possible.
The ultimate goal of the attack is to recovery the 64 bit key of Simeck32. In order to reduce the number of guessed subkey bits in the Simeck key recovery process, we use the equivalent-subkey technique to move the subkey of the ith round to the (i − 1)th round and obtain the equivalentsubkeyK (i−1) (i = 16, 17, · · · , 22). As shown in Figure 2 , we take rk 21 as an example. Figure 2 (1) is the original structure of the Simeck. For the sake of equivalent mobility without changing the structure of the algorithm, rk 21 should be XOR to the corresponding bits, as illustrated in Figure 2(2) . Therefore, K 21 is equivalent with rk 21 . Further, rk 20 ⊕ (rk 21 <<< 1) can be moved in a similar way, so K 20 is equal to rk 20 ⊕ (rk 21 <<< 1). Similarly, K i is equal to rk i ⊕ (rk i+1 <<< 1), where 15 ≤ i ≤ 19. Then transformed internal states are marked as (L i , R i ). Note that we don't need to guess K 15 .
By calculating the value, a part of the error keys can be excluded. For a guessed subkey, if ⊕R 15 (0) = 0, the guessed value is a candidate key, and the guess value must be the error key that needs to be excluded if ⊕R 15 (0) = 1. Therefore, our partial decryption goal is to find those subkey bits satisfying ⊕R 15 (0) = 0. According to the features of the Feistel structure, we know (15)). (15) . This process is shown in Figure 3 .
We use the meet-in-the-middle strategy: independently compute ⊕((L 15 (0)⊕K 16 (0)) (L 15 (11)⊕K 16 (11))⊕L 16 (0)) and store all the guessed keys and results together in the (15) independently and store the related guessed keys and results in another table Tb 2 . Finally, the correct candidate key can be obtained by checking the matching between the two tables, thus reducing the time complexity. In the computation process, we use partial-sum technology to reduce the time complexity.
1. The process of calculating Tb 1 (Figure 4 (0)) is calculated and 53 bits of equivalent subkeys are guessed. The specific process is as follows:
(1) For 2 16 (15, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14) . That is, by guessing the additional 4-bit key K 18 (9, 14) and K 19 (8, 13) and making use of the key iterative relationship, K 16 (0, 11) and K 17 (0, 6, 11) can be calculated. Consequently, the 5 bits do not need to be guessed, and the computation complexity is about 1 round Simeck 32. The calculated values Figure 5 ). ⊕R 16 (15) is calculated and 42 bits of equivalent subkeys are guessed. The specific process is as follows:
For 2 15 (5, 9, 10, 14, 15) )⊕c 17 (10, 15) according to Theorem 2. Also, rk 20 (3, 7, 8, 12, 13) = rk 21 (2, 6, 7, 11, 12 ) ⊕ K 20 (3, 7, 8, 12, 13) , rk 19 (4, 8, 9, 13, 14) = rk 20 (3, 7, 8, 12, 13 ) ⊕ K 19 (4, 8, 9, 13, 14) , rk 18 (5, 9, 10, 14, 15) = rk 19 (4, 8, 9, 13, 14) ⊕ K 18 (5, 9, 10, 14, 15) . That is, by guessing the additional 1-bit key K 21 (2) and making use of the key iterative relationship, K 17 (10, 15) can be calculated. Consequently, the 2 bits do not need to be guessed, and the computation complexity is about 1 round Simeck 32.The calculated values R 16 (15) 20 and rk 21 , and the master key can also be determined. Therefore, for the 2 63 candidate keys, check the correctness using plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
The attack program can be summarized as follows ( Figure 6 ).
First, we construct a set containing 2 31 plaintexts. The plaintext in the set satisfies the following properties: the output after encryption a round is in the forme of (A, A, A, AAAC, A, A, A, A) . Further, encrypt the plaintexts to obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. Thirdly, we guess the partial bits of the subkey K i (17 ≤ i ≤ 21), and partially decrypt the 6 rounds of the 2 31 ciphertexts to calculate ⊕R 16 (15) . The calculation results are stored in the table Tb 2 with the 43 bits guessed keys and 2 calculated bits.
Finally, for each candidate key, guess the remaining 11 bits of K i (18 ≤ i ≤ 21), The master key is calculated according to Property 1, and check the correctness of the key using two plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
D. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF INTEGRAL CRYPTANALYSIS ON 22-ROUND SIMECK32(64)
The data complexity of attacking Simeck32 is 2 31 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity of the second step is 2 56.57 + 2 47.79 ≈ 2 56.57 times of 22-round Simeck32 encryption, because the time complexity of constructing Tb 1 and Tb 2 are 2 56.57 and 2 47.79 , respectively. The time complexity of the third steps is 2 63 times of 22-round Simeck32 encryption. Therefore, the total time complexity is about 2 63 times of 22-round Simeck32 encryption.
In the course of the attack, the contents of the storage include Tb 1 and Tb 2 . For Tb 1 , 2 53 53-bit guessed subkeys, 5 bits of calculated subkeys and 1 bit computing value need to be stored, and the memory complexity of the temporary counters can be ignored, so the memory complexity is 2 55.88 bytes. For Tb 2 , 2 43 43-bit guessed subkeys, 2 bits of calculated subkeys and 1 bit computing value need to be stored, and the memory complexity of the temporary counters can be ignored, so the memory complexity is 2 45.52 bytes. Consequently, the total memory complexity is about 2 55.88 bytes.
V. INTEGRAL ATTACK ON REDUCED-ROUND SIMECK48 AND SIMECK64
The integral attack processes of Simeck48(96) and Simeck64(128) is similar to that of 22-round Simeck32(64), so we just give brief introductions to the integral attacks on 26-round Simeck48(96) and 30-round Simeck64(128).
A 17-round integral distinguisher for Simeck48(96) is given in [12] . The input is (CAAA, A, A, A, A, A, A, A, A,  A, A, A) , and the twenty-third bit in the right half part of the output state is balanced. On the basis of this distinguisher, the 18-round integral distinguisher is obtained by adding 1 round ahead. With it, we use the equivalent-subkey technology, partial-sum technology, combining with the meet-in-the middle strategy and the subkey relationship information, to decrypt the last 8 rounds, and get 2 78 79-bit candidate equivalent subkeys. After that, the 17 remaining VOLUME 7, 2019 bits of equivalent subkeys are searched exhaustively, so the full key recovery is realized. The time complexity of the attack is about 2 95 times of 26-round Simeck48 encryption, the data complexity is 2 47 chosen plaintexts, and the memory complexity is 2 82.52 bytes.
A 20-round integral distinguisher for Simeck64(128) is given in [12] . The input is (CAAA, A, A, A, A, A, A, A, A,  A, A, A, A, A, A, A) , the thirty-first bit in the right half part of the output state is balanced. On the basis of the distinguisher, the 21-round integral distinguisher is obtained by adding 1 round ahead. With it, we use the equivalent-subkey technology, partial-sum technology, combining with the meet-in-the-middle strategy and the subkey relationship information, to decrypt the last 9 rounds partially, and get 2 104 105-bi candidate equivalent subkeys. After that the 23 remaining bits of equivalent subkeys are searched exhaustively, so the full key recovery is realized. The time complexity of this attack is about 2 127.3 times of 30-round Simeck64 encryption, the data complexity is 2 63 chosen plaintexts, and the memory complexity is 2 109.02 bytes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper evaluates the security of lightweight block cipher Simeck against integral attack. By using GPU parallel computing, we solve the algebraic degree of Simeck32 quickly, thus a theoretical integral distinguisher for the 13-round is given. Based on the properties of the equivalent-subkey technology, the meet-in-the-middle strategy and the partial-sum technology, combined with the relationship of the key expansion algorithm, the integral attack on 22-round Simeck32(64) is first proposed on the basis of the 15-round integral distinguisher. Besides, the integral attacks on 26-round Simeck48(96) and 30-round Simeck64(128) are also proposed. The new results of integral attacks are concluded in Table 5 . The attack results against Simeck32(64), Simeck48(96) and Simeck64(128) are the best known integral attack results as far as we know.
